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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Lisa Tapp’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint arises from a medical procedure in
2008, and was filed long after the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act’s (“UHMA”) fouryear repose period expired. See Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1) (“A malpractice action …
shall be commenced within two years after [discovery of the injury,] but not to exceed
four years after the date of the alleged act.”). She alleges that Dr. Sherman Sorensen, an
independent cardiologist,1 performed an unnecessary surgical closure of a small hole in
her heart known as a “PFO” (patent foramen ovale). For Plaintiff’s claims to survive, she
must demonstrate that her claims were affirmatively fraudulently concealed from her by
each of the defendants she has sued. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
Plaintiff initially filed her Complaint against Intermountain and the Sorensen
defendants in August 2017, alleging various fraud-based and negligence claims against
all defendants.2 Plaintiff expressly alleged that her PFO closure occurred in September
2008, almost nine years before she filed suit. She recognized her claims were untimely
and included a section in her Complaint titled “Equitable Tolling/Fraudulent
Concealment.” However, because the date of Plaintiff’s tolling allegations failed to
include facts satisfying the UHMA repose period’s affirmative fraudulent concealment

While Dr. Sorensen had privileges to practice at both Intermountain and St. Mark’s
facilities, he was not an employee or agent of Intermountain or St. Mark’s, the other
hospital entity involved in the two other cases on appeal.
1

2

Plaintiff also alleged a federal RICO claim, which she later voluntarily withdrew. See
R.00118 n.4.
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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exception,3 Intermountain moved to dismiss her claims as untimely under Rule 12(b)(6).
In response, the district court allowed Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). However, the FAC suffered from the same deficiency, and Intermountain
again moved to dismiss, leading to the ruling at issue on appeal in Plaintiff’s case.
Unfortunately, while the district court recognized the FAC still failed to make any
allegations of affirmative fraudulent concealment, it incorrectly concluded that it was
procedurally barred from “rul[ing] on the statute of limitation/repose defense” at the
pleading stage because it believed “Plaintiff [wa]s not obligated to plead with
particularity in her complaint facts in response to the statute of limitation/repose
defense.” R.00734. The district court then ruled Plaintiff could proceed with bifurcated
discovery regarding Intermountain’s possible (but unpled) “affirmative fraudulent
concealment” of Plaintiff’s claims, despite Plaintiff’s failure to plead such allegations, let
alone with Rule 9(c)’s required particularity. R.00753–56, R.00759–62.4
Contrary to the district court’s finding, because Plaintiff’s FAC is facially
untimely, Rule 12(b)(6) obligates her to plead an exception to the UHMA’s repose period
for her claims to survive. And in her case, the potentially applicable exception to the
UHMA’s repose period requires her to plead facts demonstrating that Intermountain
affirmatively fraudulently concealed her claims from her, allegations that must satisfy
Rule 9(c)’s particularity requirements. Plaintiff has not, and cannot do this, as is

3

See Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b).

4

The district court also welcomed guidance from the appellate courts, recommending the
Court grant the currently pending interlocutory appeal. Id.
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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highlighted by the district court’s own correct application of Rule 9(c) to Plaintiff’s
affirmative claims of fraud (rather than her tolling allegations), claims the district court
recognized were subject to Rule 12. In dismissing these claims, the district court held
that the FAC contains no factual allegation of an “act of fraud by [Intermountain].”
If the district court’s procedural error is left uncorrected, particularly in light of its
recognition Plaintiff completely failed to allege that Intermountain affirmatively
fraudulently concealed anything, Intermountain will be forced to submit to full fraud
discovery of yet-to-be-pled fraud allegations. Such a result runs counter to Utah’s
established case law on Rule 12’s application, Rule 9’s plain language, and the
underlying policy of Rule 9, which serves to prevent parties from using the broad powers
of discovery to find facts they are required to have pled at the outset. Accordingly,
Intermountain asks this Court to correct the district court’s erroneous application of Rules
12(b)(6) and 9(c) and dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining stale claims against Intermountain
with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue No. 1: Did the district court err by holding that, under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(c),
Plaintiff’s FAC should not be dismissed and fraud discovery should proceed with respect
to Intermountain, despite the FAC’s facial untimeliness and its failure to include any
factual allegation that Intermountain “affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal [its]
alleged misconduct”?
Standard of Review: Denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is reviewed for
correctness. Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc. v. Teton Builders, 2005 UT 4, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 719.
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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The interpretation of rules of procedure (Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c)) and their application is
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 7, 250 P.3d 48.
Preservation of Issue: Intermountain preserved this issue below on multiple
occasions. See R.00349–61, R.00358–71; R.00054–57, R.00063–71.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Intermountain and Dr. Sorensen in August
2017, based on her PFO closure which occurred in September 2008. R.00001.
Intermountain moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s initial Complaint as facially untimely under
the UHMA’s four-year statute of repose. Mot. to Dismiss, R.00050. Thereafter, Plaintiff
requested and was granted permission to file her FAC. R.00149; R. 00317; R. 00122.
In her FAC, Plaintiff again pled that she received negligent medical care in 2008,
nearly nine years before commencing legal proceedings in 2017. R.00132–37 at ¶¶ 37,
39–42, 45, 48. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Sorensen fraudulently induced her to undergo a PFO
closure in 2008 at an Intermountain facility. R.00134 at ¶ 43. Plaintiff further alleges Dr.
Sorensen’s medical records at that time contain “fraudulent misrepresentations,
falsehoods, and other misleading statements.” R.00135 at ¶ 44. The FAC contains no
factual allegation of affirmative fraud by Intermountain, but instead contains several
allegations that Intermountain disclosed information to patients regarding when PFO
closure is medically necessary. See generally R.00122–146; R.00736; R.00753–56;
R.00311–13; R.00130–32 at ¶¶ 32–34 (alleging publication of Intermountain “Fact
Sheets” and web pages stating that “PFO Closure has not been found to reliably reduce
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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migraines” and “there is no conclusive evidence that fixing a PFO will benefit
migraines”).
Despite the absence of any allegation of affirmative fraudulent concealment
against Intermountain, Plaintiff alleged the legal conclusion that her claims against
Intermountain are saved from untimeliness under the affirmative fraudulent concealment
provision in Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b). R.00146 at ¶ 108 (“Defendants’ affirmative
acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiff’s injury
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently in 2017.
Such conduct tolls the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B3-404(b) [sic].”).
Intermountain again moved to dismiss the FAC’s facially untimely claims, which
still failed to allege Intermountain “affirmative[ly]” acted to fraudulently prevent Plaintiff
from timely pursuing her claims within the four-year repose period.5 See R.00347.
Disposition Below
On August 9, 2018, the district court resolved Intermountain’s motion, agreeing with
Intermountain’s substantive arguments regarding the application of the UHMA’s statute
of repose and its exception in section 78B-3-404(2)(b). R.00736–37; R.00747–56. The
district court further acknowledged the FAC contains no allegation of an “affirmative act
of fraud by [Intermountain],” R.00754, and dismissed Plaintiff’s affirmative fraud-based
5

The district court expressly permitted Defendants to file motions to dismiss the FAC,
but also ordered that Defendants file answers to the FAC “so that the case may proceed,”
R.00316, which Intermountain did on April 16, 2018 shortly after filing its Motion to
Dismiss the FAC, R.00499.
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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claims against Intermountain. R.00736–37. The district court also dismissed Plaintiff’s
affirmative claim of conspiracy against all defendants “[h]aving dismissed the underlying
predicate for the conspiracy claim (i.e., the fraud claim),” leaving only her negligence
claims against Intermountain. R.00737. The district court reasoned:
The allegations of [Intermountain’s] fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to have
surgery are non-existent. There is nothing but conclusory statements where
the plaintiff lumps the “defendants” in together and there is not one fact in
the complaint that would support that [Intermountain] was somehow
involved in a fraud in 2008. There is no fact stated in the complaint that
even alleges, let alone with any degree of particularity, as required under
Rule 9, U.R.C.P., that [Intermountain] was involved in a fraud on Plaintiff
in 2008.
R.00736 (emphasis in original).6
The district court also correctly held that the narrow exception to the four-year
repose period within § 78B-3-404(2)(b) requires not just allegations of “‘fraudulent
concealment’ (which, in normal parlance, might encompass silence in the face of a duty
to disclose) but a much narrower ‘affirmative act to fraudulently conceal.’” R.00754.
This is because “the legislature intended that only the ‘affirmative act’ branch of
fraudulent concealment – and not concealment by silence – would apply as an exception
under the statute.” R.00755.7 After finding that Plaintiff had adequately alleged a
The district court also recognized that the singular fraud properly alleged in Plaintiff’s
complaints concerns alleged misrepresentations by Dr. Sorensen in 2008 that induced
Plaintiff to have the PFO procedure and thereafter Dr. Sorensen “perpetuat[ed] that
falsehood by his silence.” R.00751–52; R.00312 (citing R.00134–35 at ¶¶ 43–44).
These allegations, however, involve only Dr. Sorensen. See id.
6

In making this finding, the district court noted the legislature’s codification of its
“Legislative Findings and Declarations” regarding the UHMA. R.00748. The court
stated the UHMA “was borne out of the legislatures’ concern that increasing malpractice
claims had resulted in ‘substantial increases’ in medical malpractice insurance, and the
7
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scheme of affirmative fraudulent concealment on the part of Dr. Sorensen,8 the court
acknowledged that with regard to Intermountain “Plaintiff has a much steeper hill to
climb to avail [herself] of the statutory exception at issue,” having pled “no [fraud] facts
… let alone facts with a level of particularity[] to support a claim against
[Intermountain].” R.00753–54.
The district court also held that to toll the repose period through affirmative
concealment fraud, a particular defendant’s conduct must “cause … a plaintiff’s inability
to have discover[ed] the alleged misconduct by [that] provider.” R.00756.9
resulting ‘increased health care costs’ which are then passed through to the patient.”
R.00749. The court also recognized the legislature “intended to curtail individual
malpractice cases in the ‘public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage
private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance’”
and that the periods for timely pursuing claims are statutorily recognized “to provide a
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care providers while
limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums
can be reasonably and accurately calculated.” Id. (quoting § 78B-2-402(2)) (emphasis
in original).
8

In finding fraud allegations against Dr. Sorensen sufficient, the district court rejected
the argument that section 78B-3-404(2)(b) “implicitly requires some later affirmative act
of fraud that kept Plaintiff from discovering the wrongfulness of his actions,” which
Plaintiff had not alleged as to either Defendant. See R.00752 (emphasis in original)
(“[Dr. Sorensen’s] fraudulent misrepresentation at the outset, followed by years of
perpetuating that falsehood by his silence, meets the standard for fraudulent concealment
under the statute.”).
9

The district court held that under § 78B-3-404(2)(b), a plaintiff who asserts a claim after
the four-year repose period must prove the following:
1. That the provider “affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct”;
2. That, as a result, the plaintiff was prevented from discovering the provider’s
misconduct during the repose period; and
3. That plaintiff filed her claim within one year of (actually or constructively)
discovering concealment.
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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However, rather than dismiss the FAC, given this factual void and the exacting
requirements of the UHMA’s repose exception, the district court accepted as sufficient
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that “Defendants’ … conduct tolls the limitations
pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b) [sic].” R.00146 at ¶ 108;
R.00734. The district court did so based on its holding that Plaintiff was not obligated,
under Rule 12, to plead an exception to the UHMA’s repose period to maintain her
facially untimely claims. R.00734. The court then ordered bifurcated discovery on the
limited issue of the currently unpled affirmative fraudulent concealment of Plaintiff’s
claims. R.00747.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Despite finding that Plaintiff’s FAC contains no allegation of an “affirmative act
of fraud by [Intermountain],” R.00754, the district court refused to dismiss Plaintiff’s
negligence claims against Intermountain based on its misapplication of Rules 12(b)(6)
and 9(c). The district court’s erroneous interpretation of these rules should be corrected
and made consistent with settled Utah law, which holds that a facially untimely complaint
is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the plaintiff affirmatively pleads an
exception to the applicable statute of limitations or repose. And when that exception
involves a fraudulent act on the part of the defendant, like Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b),
such fraudulent acts—as with all allegations of fraud—must be pled with particularity
under Rule 9(c). Intermountain accordingly requests that this Court reverse the district

R.00751 (emphasis in original).
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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court’s procedural error in interpreting Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(c) and, given the lack of
any allegations sufficient to save her facially untimely claims, dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Intermountain with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS
PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FAC AS
UNTIMELY UNDER RULE 12(b)(6).
The district court’s holding that it could not dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claims

at the pleading stage because not all the “facts of fraudulent concealment” were in
Plaintiff’s FAC10 misapplies Rule 12. R.00734. As addressed below, Utah precedent
makes Rule 12(b)(6) applicable to facially untimely complaints, and the UHMA’s repose
period is facially applicable to the FAC, which alleges the date of care at issue.
A.

Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a facially untimely complaint.

In Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d 947, this
Court recognized that in some cases “the existence of [an] affirmative defense may
appear within the complaint itself.” Id. “‘A complaint showing that the statute of
limitations has run on the claims is the most common situation in which the affirmative
defense appears on the face of the pleading [and] inclusion of dates in the complaint

10

To the contrary, Plaintiff clearly attempted to allege that the statute of repose should be
tolled based on fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff dedicated an entire section of the FAC
to “Equitable Tolling/Fraudulent Concealment,” in which she alleges, in conclusory
fashion, that “Defendants’” conduct “tolls the limitations period pursuant to the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b) [sic].” R.00145–46. As the district court
correctly acknowledged, these allegations as to Intermountain are entirely conclusory and
include no affirmative acts of fraudulent concealment on Intermountain’s part. R.00754.
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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indicating that the action is untimely renders its subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim’ … under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. (emphasis added). In Tucker the complaint did not
allege the date that an insurance company refused to pay, but “[h]ad this date been
specified by the [plaintiffs], the allegations of the complaint itself would have clearly
demonstrated that the [plaintiffs’] claim was time barred, rendering the motion to dismiss
an appropriate procedural vehicle for raising the statute of limitations.” Id. at ¶ 9.11
Here, Plaintiff alleges she received negligent medical care in 2008, far more than
four years before commencing legal proceedings in 2017. R.00132–37 at ¶¶ 37, 39–42,
45, 48. Because Plaintiff alleges the dates of her care and the UHMA includes a fouryear period of repose that is dependent only on the date of care,12 “the allegations of the
complaint itself … have clearly demonstrated that the [Plaintiff’s] claim [is] time barred,
rendering the motion to dismiss an appropriate procedural vehicle for raising the statute
of [repose].” Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 9.
Several Utah appellate decisions have upheld Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals when
complaints facially establish an affirmative defense, including where plaintiffs have
inadequately attempted to plead around facial untimeliness. Most recently, in Young
Resources Ltd. Partnership v. Promontory Landfill LLC, 2018 UT App 99, 2018 WL
2470958, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of untimely
claims because “the face of the complaint … establish[es] that the claims are time-barred
Because the trial court in Tucker had to go outside the complaint’s allegations to
determine the date of the refusal to pay, this Court upheld dismissal under a converted
motion for summary judgment. Id. at ¶ 10.
11

12

See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1)
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[and the plaintiff failed to offer] a factual basis for tolling the statute.” Id. at ¶ 31 (citing
Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041, n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) and Butler v.
Deutsche Morgan Grentell, Inc., 140 N.M. 111, ¶ 33, 140 P.3d 532 (2006)); Mast v. First
Madison Servs., Inc., 2009 UT App 162, 2009 WL 1709017, at *1 n.2 (“Dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) … is appropriate where the claim is time-barred based on the allegations of
the complaint itself” and finding equitable discovery allegations insufficient); Lowery v.
Brigham Young Univ., 2004 UT App 182, 2004 WL 1368173 (affirming dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) based on facial untimeliness and finding allegations of tolling based upon
alleged mental illness to be inadequately pled); see also Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
2017 UT 67, ¶ 54 n.6, 416 P.3d 338 (affirming dismissal because complaint facially pled
the absence of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an affirmative defense).
In Russell Packard Devel., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741, this Court
applied the same analysis to test the untimeliness of a pleading. The plaintiff avoided
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, but only because the plaintiff’s allegations “made a prima facie
showing of fraudulent concealment.” Id. at ¶¶ 13, 40. Notably, this Court in Tucker cited
to federal authority, as it does frequently,13 for the proposition that dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is procedurally proper when a complaint facially alleges that a limitations period
has run, and tolling allegations are not adequately pled in accordance with Rule 9.
Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8 (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
13

See Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 12 n.1, 104 P.3d 1226
(recognizing that Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and when
Utah case law is absent “we ‘freely resort to federal law as a useful guide.’”) (quoting
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 741 n.9 (Utah 1990)).
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Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 345 (2d ed. 1990)). Federal authority on this point
appears to be uniform.14
Contrary to this established procedural law, the district court here found Rule 12
inapplicable to Plaintiff’s facially untimely negligence allegations, concluding that
Plaintiff need not plead facts to overcome the facial untimeliness she alleges regarding
her dates of care because “the facts of fraudulent concealment are not in the complaint
and can’t be unless the issue is before the Court in full.”15 R.00734. No authority is cited
to support the district court’s circular statement regarding what facts Plaintiff would need
to plead in order to rule under Rule 12(b)(6) on a statute of repose. See id. And, contrary

14

See Boettcher v. Conoco Phillips Co., 721 Fed. Appx. 823, 824-25 (10th Cir. 2018)
(affirming dismissal because untimeliness is evident from allegations and tolling is
supported only by a “conclusory statement as to the application of [tolling without
relevant] factual allegations”); Lee v. Rocky Mtn. UFCW Unions and Employers Trust, 13
P.3d 405, *1 (10th Cir. 1993) (limitations defense “may be appropriately resolved on a
12(b)(6) motion [because] the dates given in the complaint make clear that the right sued
upon had been extinguished”); Ballen v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 23 F.3d 335,
336–37 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal based on facial untimeliness and
because plaintiff “has not adequately alleged fraudulent concealment to toll the
limitations period”); Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119–20 (9th Cir.
1980) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal based on facial untimeliness and because plaintiff did
not meet obligation to “plead with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of
fraudulent concealment”); Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877, 879–80 (8th Cir.
2011) (“once it is clear from the face of the complaint that an action is [untimely plaintiff
must] meet his burden of sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment
saves his otherwise time-barred claims”); Adams v. Am. Med. System, Inc., 2014 WL
1670090, at *2 (D. Utah April 28, 2014) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where the complaint’s
dates made clear that the right sued upon has extinguished and the plaintiff fails to come
forward with a factual basis to toll); Warnick v. McCotter, 2003 WL 23355718, at *3–4
(D. Utah Dec. 29, 2008) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where dates in complaint made clear
that claim was untimely and assertion of fraudulent concealment was unsupported).
15

See supra n.10.
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to the district court’s statement, the on-point cases in Utah and elsewhere all recognize
that the only fact necessary to permit dismissal based on untimeliness is the date that
initiates the statutory period of repose or limitation. See Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8 (dates
in complaint); Young Resources, 2018 UT App 99, ¶ 31 (same); Mast, 2009 UT App 162,
at *1 (same); Lowery, 2004 UT App 182, at *1 (same); supra n.9 (citing federal cases
referencing dates in complaints).
B.

The UHMA’s repose period is facially applicable to Plaintiff’s FAC.

Critically, when a repose rather than a limitation period is at issue, the only
relevant date is the date the repose period begins because “accrual,” “discovery,” and
other similar concepts are not part of a repose analysis.16 When that date is alleged on the
face of a complaint, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of alleging a basis for tolling that
will save her claims. In short, if a plaintiff pleads herself out of court, she must also
plead facts supporting an exception letting her back in. And in this case, as addressed in
Section II infra, she must do so with particularity under Rule 9(c). Young Resources
addressed this procedural question. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that if a
complaint’s facially untimely allegations cannot trigger dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

16

Repose periods as found in § 78B-3-404(1) serve the important public policy of ending
the possibility of claims irrespective of accrual or injury. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134
S. Ct. 2175, 2182–83 (2014) (“[s]tatutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a
defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time”);
Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 189
(Utah 1989) (“Statutes of repose promote the public goal of certainty and finality … and
terminate liability at a set time.”); Jensen v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2018 UT 27,
¶ 18, 424 P.3d 885 (confirming § 78B-3-404(1) contains a repose period running from
the date of care).
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statute of limitations defense that is subject to the discovery rule could never be
successfully asserted in a motion to dismiss, and that is clearly not the rule.” 2018 UT
App 99, ¶ 31 (quoting Butler) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff put repose untimeliness at issue by alleging that the negligent
medical care occurred in 2008. R.00132–37 at ¶¶ 37, 39–42, 45, 48. Rather than plead
facts creating a fact issue concerning affirmative fraudulent concealment and potential
tolling of this date, Plaintiff instead sought to invoke an exception to facial untimeliness
with nothing but a bare legal conclusion.17 R.00146 at ¶ 108. This should have resulted
in dismissal of all claims against Intermountain, rather than an invitation for Plaintiff to
begin fishing for unalleged, possible affirmative fraudulent concealment (something she
should have been aware of before filing her Complaint).
It is settled Utah law that after alleging a facially untimely claim, a plaintiff has
the burden to come forward and allege a reason her complaint is timely. Tucker, 2002
UT 54, ¶ 9; Young Resources, 2018 UT App 99, ¶ 31; Mast, 2009 UT App 162, at *1 n.2;
Lowery, 2004 UT App 182, at *1; see also Bivens, 2017 UT 67, ¶ 54.18 Plaintiff has not
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that her claims fit within section 78B-3-404(2)(b)’s
narrow exception is an explicit admission that she bears the burden to plead a tolling
exception under § 78B-3-404(2)(b)—something the district court correctly found she
failed to do, but incorrectly held did not compel dismissal of her FAC.
17

Plaintiff cited no contrary Utah or other law in the district court. Plaintiff’s and the
district court’s reliance on cases like Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005
UT App 325, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 891, is misplaced, because in that case, and the others cited,
an affirmative defense was not apparent on the face of the plaintiff’s own allegations.
Indeed, in Zoumadakis, the court recognized that the general rule that complaints do not
need to anticipate affirmative defenses has no application when “the allegations of the
complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as
when a complaint plainly reveals that an action is untimely under the governing statute of
18
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done so, and the district court’s decision allowing her claims to survive dismissal is legal
error and should be reversed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALLEGATIONS
OF FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT UNDER UTAH CODE § 78B-3404(2)(b) NEED NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 9(c).
The district court correctly held, in three separate written orders, that Plaintiff’s

Complaint and FAC allege nothing more than a bare legal conclusion of “affirmative
fraudulent concealment” against Intermountain. R.00736; R.00753–56; R.00311–13
(“Defendants maintain that these new allegations [in the FAC] are still insufficient under
Rule 9. … In fact, those additional allegations appear to be conclusory in nature without
any measure of particularity.”). Yet, because of the misapplication of Rule 12 addressed
above, the district court found Plaintiff was not obligated to plead such facts, let alone do
so with particularity. This failure to require the UHMA’s repose exception to be pled
with particularity runs counter to Utah law, which requires that allegations of fraudulent
concealment under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) not only be pled, but be pled with particularity.
See Chapman v. Primary Children’s Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1185–86 (Utah 1989); see
also Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, 2009 WL 3490974 (dismissing malpractice
claims under Rule 9 for failure to plead affirmative fraudulent concealment with
particularity). Contrary to the district court’s opinion, for Plaintiff’s remaining claims to
survive, she must plead facts demonstrating the UHMA’s affirmative fraudulent
concealment exception is applicable, and the allegations must satisfy Rule 9(c).
limitations.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005))
(emphasis added).
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A.

Rule 9(c) is applicable to any allegations of fraud, including allegations
of affirmative fraudulent concealment under the UHMA.

Rule 9(c) states that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c)
(emphasis added). The rule’s plain language makes no exception based on whether the
allegation is in an affirmative claim, a counterclaim, a defense, or a response to a defense.
Id. And Utah courts read procedural rules like Rule 9(c) according to the “ordinary and
accepted meaning” of the words used. Drew, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 16. In Williams v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982), this Court held that Rule 9 applies to every
allegation of fraud, including those found in affirmative defenses:
The Rule 9(b) requirement should not be understood as limited to
allegations of common law fraud. The purpose of that requirement dictates
that it reach all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of
misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term
“fraud” in its broadest dimension.
Id. at 972.19

19

See also State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ¶ 22, 282 P.3d 66 (Rule 9(c) is not limited
to allegations of common law fraud and the rule’s purpose dictates that it reach all
circumstances where a pleader alleges misrepresentations, omissions or other deceptions
covered by the term fraud in its broadest dimension); Otsuka Elecs. (USA, Inc.) v.
Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (applying Rule 9 to
fraud affirmative defense); GDE Constr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 294 P.3d 567, 571 (Utah Ct.
App. 2012) (applying Rule 9 to mistake affirmative defense). Apparently recognizing
Rule 9 applies to all allegations of fraud irrespective of the procedural posture of the
pleading, Plaintiff originally did not argue that her allegation of affirmative fraudulent
concealment was not subject to Rule 9. See R.00525–33 (arguing compliance with Rule
9). Plaintiff argued Rule 9 might not apply to her fraudulent concealment allegations
under § 78B-3-404 only after the district court’s sua sponte ruling regarding Rule 9’s
application.
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Utah and federal cases routinely apply Rule 9 when fraud is pled as a possible way
around an affirmative defense. For example, in Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 858
(Utah 1983), a plaintiff sued after a car accident and the defendant asserted the
affirmative defense of a prior release. This Court held that in arguing the release was
executed based upon “fraud,” the plaintiff was required, but failed to allege in the
complaint, the elements of fraud under Rule 9. Id. at 858.
Most importantly, this Court has found that allegations of affirmative fraudulent
concealment satisfying the UHMA’s repose exception must be pled with particularity.
See Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1185–86. In Chapman, this Court stated that allegations of
affirmative fraudulent concealment asserted under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) (at the time
designated § 78-14-4(1)(b)) must be made under Rule 9 and “mere conclusory
[affirmative fraudulent concealment] allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a
recitation of relevant surroundings, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary
judgment.” Id. (emphasis added). This Court applied Rule 9 to the statute at issue
here—§ 78B-3-404(2)(b)—and concluded that allegations of affirmative fraudulent
concealment by Dr. Veasy, one of the defendant physicians, were sufficient, but such
allegations against Dr. Myer, another defendant physician, were not. Id.20

20

The trial court in Chapman granted summary judgment, finding that because matters
outside the pleadings were considered, it was proper to view the matter as resolved under
Rule 56. Id. at 1182 n.1. This Court noted the procedural history but it applied its
analysis to allegations, and stated that a failure to comply with Rule 9 will result in
“dismissal or summary judgment.” Id. at 1186 (emphasis added).
{01808385.DOCX / 5}
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Roth v. Pedersen is consistent with Chapman and addresses allegations that are
indistinguishable from those made against Intermountain here. 2009 UT App 313. In
Roth, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Chapman and held that under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) a
plaintiff who failed to allege that he consulted with a defendant about prior medical care
could not have been affirmatively misled into a delayed filing, and thus has not stated a
legally sufficient tolling allegation under Rule 9. Id. at *3–4.21 Consequently, the
plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed. Id.
Federal authorities also uniformly agree that Rule 9 applies to allegations of
fraudulent concealment meant to plead around an affirmative defense to a facially
untimely complaint. The treatise this Court cited in Tucker, for example, makes clear
allegations of fraudulent concealment meant to toll a limitations period “fall within the
heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b).” C. Wright & A. Miller, 5A Federal

21

In connection with his March 7, 2018 leave to amend ruling, the district court cited
Roth and concluded that “[a]lthough the Court [of Appeals] separately addressed the
fraudulent concealment exception to the statute of limitations, it appeared to be
addressing Plaintiff’s alternative fraudulent concealment claim when it held that under
Rule 9, that claim must be pled with particularity.” R.00315. In Roth, the Utah Court of
Appeals used the word “claim” without stating whether it intended to reference an
affirmative claim or an allegation of fraudulent concealment for tolling (a response to a
defense). 2009 UT App 313, at *3. In subsequently moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC,
Intermountain supplied the district court with the appeal briefs in Roth. See R.00393–
466. Those briefs remove any ambiguity and demonstrate that no affirmative
concealment claim was ever made in Roth, and the Utah Court of Appeals applied Rule 9
to tolling allegations under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) that are indistinguishable from those made
here against Intermountain. Specifically, the plaintiff in Roth, as Plaintiff has tried to do
with Intermountain, relied exclusively on non-disclosure allegations. After these briefs
were provided, Plaintiff has not asserted that the Roth opinion addresses an affirmative
claim rather than possible tolling of the repose period due to affirmative fraud (i.e., a
response to an affirmative defense), and has otherwise failed to distinguish Roth.
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18

Practice and Procedure § 1297 (3rd ed. 2017) (superseding § 1357 from 2nd ed.).
Additional treatises and federal law uniformly recognize Rule 9 applies to a plaintiff’s
allegations of fraudulent concealment meant to toll a limitation or repose period.22
B. Plaintiff’s remaining claims in the FAC fail to satisfy Rule 9(c).
The district court correctly recognized that Plaintiff makes no allegations of
affirmative fraudulent concealment because Plaintiff fails to allege Intermountain even
interacted with her, let alone caused her to delay filing her claims through affirmative
fraud.23 Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations against Intermountain are almost exclusively that
See 1 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 7:57 (4th ed. 2017) (“[Rule 9] applies where
fraudulent concealment is pleaded in anticipation of the affirmative defense of the statute
of limitations.”); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 402 (2018) (a “plaintiff must allege
… fraudulent concealment with distinctness and particularity.”); Id. § 420 (same); Ballen,
23 F.3d at 336–37 (affirming dismissal because untimeliness was clear from the
complaint’s facial allegations and concealment allegations were inadequately pled under
Rule 9); Conerly, 623 F.2d at 119–20 (same); Summerhill, 637 F.3d at 879–80 (same);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88–89 (2nd Cir. 1983) (same); Gulley v. Pierce &
Associates, P.C., 436 Fed. Appx. 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).
22

This stands in contrast to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Dr. Sorensen, whom the
district court found had allegedly engaged in “affirmative misrepresentation at the outset”
according to Plaintiff’s FAC, and that such an initial fraud allegation satisfies the
UHMA’s fraudulent concealment exception. R.00752. This conclusion, though not
required to support the district court’s correct finding that Plaintiff has failed to allege
any affirmative fraud by Intermountain “with any degree of particularity,” R.00751, is
inconsistent with Utah law. This Court in Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred held that tolling
fraud claims based on fraudulent concealment is appropriate only when the concealment
act is separate from (and therefore subsequent to) the alleged fraud. 2008 UT 22, ¶ 37,
182 P.3d 337 (“It would be circular to toll the statute of limitations … merely because the
defendant commits fraud or breaches a fiduciary duty without some further showing that
the defendant also concealed it from the plaintiff.” (emphasis added)). State and federal
courts routinely apply this principle from Allred to dispose of untimely claims, and
applied properly in this case, it provides an independent basis for dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims against Intermountain. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Blue Mtn. Women’s Clinic, 286
Mont. 60, 75 (1997) (“[F]ailure to disclose [must be] an act separate from the alleged act
of malpractice upon which the claim for professional negligence rests.”); Liddell v. First
23
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of general disclosure that PFO closure “has not been found to reliably reduce migraines,”
or at most, passive silence (“IHC made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform
patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery”). See, e.g., R.00130–
32 at ¶¶ 32–34 (emphasis added). Despite the absence of any supporting fraud facts,
Plaintiff alleges the bare legal conclusion that her claims against “Defendants” are saved
from facial untimeliness under the UHMA’s narrow affirmative fraudulent concealment
exception. R.00146 at ¶ 108; State v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2019 UT App 31, ¶
19, -- P.3d – (relying on Rule 9(c) to affirm dismissal with prejudice of conclusory fraud
claims “pleaded in the collective” against multiple defendants).
Despite this, the district court found Rule 9 inapplicable to an “affirmative
fraudulent concealment” allegation made in response to an affirmative defense. R.00734.
In doing so, the district court effectively barred the statute of repose defense from being
raised under Rule 12(b)(6), something that is entirely inconsistent with Utah cases and
the very purpose of Rule 9. See supra Section II.A. Rule 9 contains no such limitation,
and its express language applies to every allegation of fraud, whether pled in an
affirmative claim, in an affirmative defense, or in a response to an affirmative defense as
Plaintiff attempts to do in paragraph 108 of her FAC.
C.

Fraud discovery is improper when a plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 9(c).

Utah and federal case law also recognize that a critical purpose of Rule 9 is to
prevent fraud discovery from proceeding before fraud has been alleged with particularity,
Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 146 F. App’x 748, 751 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiffs must prove a
subsequent affirmative act of fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations [period].”).
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and the scope of such discovery thereby properly framed. See Shah v. Intermountain
Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 261, ¶ 12, 314 P.3d 1079 (“[A] plaintiff alleging fraud
must know what his claim is when he files it” and a fraud claim should “seek to redress
… a wrong, not … find one”) (quoting Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956
F.2d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 1992) and Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607–08 (2nd Cir.
1972)); Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, ¶ 11, 344 P.3d 156
(“Plaintiff’s assertion that they will ‘not know until discovery’ the specific
misrepresentations made is precisely what Rule 9(b) seeks to prevent.”).
Indeed, because the filing of the lawsuit itself evidences a plaintiff’s undisputed
knowledge of his or her claims, a plaintiff alleging claims could not have been brought
earlier because of a defendant’s fraudulent concealment must necessarily be in possession
of the specific facts of such concealment. This is particularly true here, where such
concealment must be affirmative. Otherwise, a plaintiff lacks the facts needed to bring
the suit in the first instance. Relieving a plaintiff of the burden to make such a showing
runs counter to the purpose of Rule 9(c), which requires allegations of fraud to be pled
with particularity, i.e., to keep the doors of discovery closed to fraud claims that are
easily alleged, but difficult to prove. Requiring specificity commits a plaintiff to a
version of events that must at least appear plausible before being given the full powers of
formal discovery to go in search of evidence to support allegations of such serious
wrongdoing.
Under this settled law, the district court erred in refusing to dismiss Plaintiff’s
FAC, and Plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed with discovery regarding an unpled
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fraud. Utah and federal cases recognize that discovery in this context is simply improper.
See cases cited supra; Caprin v. Simon Transp. Servs., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (D.
Utah 2000) (“The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to prevent the filing of a complaint as a pretext
for the discovery of unknown wrongs.”). Accordingly, Intermountain requests that this
Court reverse the district court’s decision misapplying Rule 12 and refusing to apply Rule
9’s heightened pleading standards to Plaintiff’s allegations of affirmative fraudulent
concealment under § 78B-3-404(2)(b). The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining
claims with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Intermountain respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court’s
application of Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and dismiss
as untimely under section 78B-3-404(1) all remaining claims against Intermountain with
prejudice.
DATED this 18th day of March, 2019.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR PLLC

/s/ Jack T. Nelson
Alan C. Bradshaw
Chad R. Derum
John (Jack) T. Nelson
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc.
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ADDENDUM
Contents: (1) Utah Code § 78B-3-404; (2) August 9, 2018 Order;
(3) August 9, 2018 Discovery Order
78B-3-404. Statute of limitations - Exceptions - Application.
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two
years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years
after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1):
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a
foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be
barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of
the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; or

(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
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(3) The limitations in this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or
other legal disability under Section 78B-2-108 or any other provision of the law.
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: August 09, 2018
/s/ BARRY LAWRENCE
10:29:54 AM
District Court Judge

Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com

Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT – SALT LAKE CITY

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LISA TAPP,

PROPOSED ORDER

)
)

Case No. 170904956
Judge Barry Lawrence

)
Plaintiff,

)
)

v.
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)
SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.;
)
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR
GROUP; AND IHC HEALTH SERVICES, )
INC.,
)
)
Defendants.

)
)

This matter having come before the Court on May 25, 2018 before the Honorable Judge
Barry Lawrence. Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on behalf of
Plaintiff Lisa Tapp. Alan Bradshaw and Jack Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant IHC
Health Services, Inc., and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke appeared on behalf of Defendants
Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group. The matter before the Court was a
hearing on Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
The Court notes the relevant procedural history. After plaintiff filed her Complaint, a
motion to dismiss was filed, followed by a request to file an amended complaint. On February
20, 2018, the Court held argument on the motion to amend and rejected defendants’ futility
arguments in an Order dated March 7, 2018. After the Amended Complaint, was filed another
set of motions to dismiss were filed; they were heard on May 14, 2018. The Court announced its
ruling in a telephone conference on May 25, 2018. That ruling is reflected herein; but to the
extent that ruling differs from this Order, the oral ruling should control.
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Having considered the motions, the Court dismisses the fraud/misrepresentation claims
against IHC Health Services, Inc. and the conspiracy claim as to all Defendants. Other than that,
the Court denies the motions, leaving the negligence claims against Dr. Sorensen, the negligence
claims against IHC Health Services, Inc., and the fraud/misrepresentation claims against Dr.
Sorensen.
The Court concludes that it cannot rule on the statute of limitation/repose defense based
on the pleadings. Plaintiff is not obligated to plead with particularity in her complaint facts in
response to the statute of limitation/repose defense. The Plaintiff is not obligated to meet a
heightened pleading requirement relating to facts that would serve to defeat an impending
defense. Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 325, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 891,
893–94 (“the burden of pleading the inapplicability of [privilege] is not initially on the plaintiff,
and it is not incumbent on the plaintiff or party filing a complaint to anticipate an affirmative
defense which the answer may disclose”).
The Court is not persuaded by the Defendants’ argument to the contrary, and there is a
distinction for cases where the complaint is “facially invalid” or untimely. The Court reads
Defendants’ cited cases as standing for the proposition that when all the facts necessary to
determine an affirmative defense are stated in the complaint, then the affirmative defense can be
resolved in a Rule 12 motion. That is not the case here where the facts of fraudulent concealment
are not in the complaint and can’t be unless the issue is before the Court in full.
In Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d 947, all of the
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applicable dates were in the complaint and so the court ruled as a matter of law. There was no
assertion of a defense to the defense of statute of limitation, and so it was not inappropriate for
the court to rule. Again, it appears to the Court that all facts necessary to decide the Rule 12
motion were in the complaint, which again is a far cry from this case. Van De Grift v. State, 2013
UT 11, 299 P.3d 1043 was dismissed on immunity grounds because there is immunity for claims
that arise based on fraud and the complaint alleged facts of fraud. Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
2017 UT 67 involved exhaustion of remedies, which is a jurisdictional issue. There the complaint
made clear that there was no exhaustion. And, in footnote the Bivens court said: “We do not hold
today that a plaintiff’s complaint must affirmatively plead exhaustion of legal remedies.” And in
Lowery v. Brigham Young University, 2004 UT App 182, the complaint on its face reflected
when the plaintiff discovered his claim, which meant that as a matter of law, the discovery rule
could not apply and, therefore, the court could rule on the pleadings. None of these cases stand
for the proposition that a plaintiff in the first instance has the obligation to state facts necessary
to defeat a statute of limitations defense at all, let alone with a degree of particularity. The issue
of whether the plaintiff can prove fraudulent concealment required under § 78B-3-404 will have
to be based upon what we learn factually in discovery and to be decided at summary judgment or
at trial. Accordingly, the Court DENIES all of the statute of limitations issues raised by the
Defendants.
The Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be consolidated into one
medical malpractice claim. While the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does have a broad
definition of what a malpractice claim is for procedural purposes, the Court is not aware of any
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authority that prevents a plaintiff from asserting alternative facts of fraud or negligence against
Dr. Sorensen, and the elements of each would have to be proven at trial. However, the Court
notes that it appears that there are multiple claims of negligence and multiple claims of fraud,
and The Court will not dismiss those at this time. The plaintiff is certainly entitled to pursue its
claims. But ultimately at trial, there will be one negligence claim against Dr. Sorensen and one
fraud claim and if the standard of care encompasses various things that’s fine, but those are not
separate claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen Defendants’ motion.
IHC Health Services, Inc.’s motion to dismiss the misrepresentation claims is
GRANTED. It is important to note that there is a distinction here between the fraud associated
with the 2008 surgery and any alleged fraud that took place thereafter that is relevant to statute of
limitation/repose. The allegations of IHC Health Services, Inc.’s fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to
have surgery are non-existent. There is nothing but conclusory statements where the plaintiff
lumps the “defendants” in together and there is not one fact in the complaint that would support
that IHC Health Services, Inc. was somehow involved in a fraud in 2008. There is no fact stated
in the complaint that even alleges, let alone with any degree of particularity, as required under
Rule 9, U.R.C.P., that IHC Health Services, Inc. was involved in a fraud on Plaintiff in 2008. So
that claim against IHC Health Services, Inc. is DISMISSED. The fraud claim against Dr.
Sorensen will survive and the motion DENIED. There are ample allegations of facts supporting
this fraudulent inducement theory in 2008 by Dr. Sorensen. But there is absolutely nothing
demonstrating any fraud by IHC Health Services, Inc. or any sort of illegal conduct or wrong by
IHC Health Services, Inc. and the predicate for a conspiracy claim has not been alleged. There
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are no facts alleged against IHC Health Services, Inc. of fraud and conspiracy at the time the
surgery was done.
The conspiracy claim, like the fraud claims, is governed by Rule 9 and Rule 9 requires a
showing of particularity. Williams v. State Farm, 656 P.2d 966 (1982); Coroles v. Sabey, 2003
UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (2003); Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19,
344 P.3d 156. Having dismissed fraud claims against IHC Health Services, Inc. the Court is
compelled to dismiss the conspiracy claim between the Defendants as well. (Having dismissed
the underlying predicate for the conspiracy claim (i.e., the fraud claim), there can be no
conspiracy claim as a matter of law.). The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions as to
conspiracy and DISMISSES the conspiracy claim against all Defendants.
In summary, the Court:
GRANTS IHC Health Services, Inc.’s motion as to the misrepresentation claims and
DISMISSES the Third; Fifth; and Sixth Claims for Relief against IHC Health Services, Inc.;
GRANTS the Defendants’ motions as to the conspiracy claim and DISMISSES the Seventh
Claim for Relief against all Defendants; and otherwise
DENIES the motions to dismiss.
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date
and seal at the top of the first page***
-------------------------------------------END OF DOCUMENT-------------------------------------------Approved as to form:
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of David Hobbs)
David Hobbs
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR
/s/ Jack T. Nelson
Alan C. Bradshaw
John T. (Jack) Nelson
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc.
STRONG & HANNI
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of Michael J. Miller)
Michael J. Miller
Attorneys for Sorensen Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following
via email on 31st day of July 2018:
David Hobbs
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Alan C. Bradshaw
John (Jack) T. Nelson
Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone: 801-363-5678
Fax: 801-364-5678
abradshaw@mc2b.com
jnelson@mc2b.com
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc.
Michael J. Miller
Strong & Hanni
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
mmiller@strongandhanni.com
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group
/s/ Jack T. Nelson
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